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ABSTRACT

The individual inventor motif has been part of American
patent law since its inception. The question is whether the recent
patent troll hunt has damaged the individual inventor's image and,
in turn, caused Congress, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO), and the courts to become less concerned with
patent law's impact on the small inventor. This Article explores
whether there has been a change in attitude by looking at various
sources from legislative, administrative, and judicial actors in the
patent system, such as congressional statements and testimony in
discussions of the recent proposed patent reform legislation, the
USPTO 's two recently proposed sets ofpatent rules and responses
to comments on those rules, and recent Supreme Court patent
decisions. These sources indicate that the rhetoric of the motif has
remained unchanged, but its substantive impact is essentially nil.
The motif has done little to stave off the increasingly antiindividual-inventor changes in substantive patent law. This
investigation also provides a broader insight into the various
governmental institutions' roles in patent law by illustrating how
different institutions have responded-or not responded-to the
use of the individual inventor motif in legal and policy arguments.
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INTRODUCTION

The garage inventor is as American as apple pie. 1 We enjoy
stories of independent inventors, working against all odds to
provide society with amazing technological breakthroughs. The
stories are so entertaining that popular movies are made about such
individuals- such as Flash of Genius, telling the story of Robert
Kerns, the inventor of the intermittent windshield wiper system.2
Intel has even launched an ad campaign championing the
individual inventor, portraying individuals such as Alay Bhatt, the
inventor of the Universal Serial Bus (USB), as modem-day rock
stars. 3
The individual inventor story generally goes as follows: A
lone individual toils in her limited free time-evenings after work
and perhaps the weekend-to come up with an amazing
breakthrough that turns out to be incredibly beneficial to society. 4
This entrepreneur is unconstrained by both the bureaucracy of a
large corporate structure and the traditional thinking in a given
See Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 910
(2002); Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property
Law, 45 Rous. L. REV. 1201, 1202-03 (2008).
An important point of clarification needs to made up front concerning this
Article's use of the term "individual inventor." While this term clearly includes
individuals, who by themselves invent, the term has also been used in the
literature to include small businesses and entrepreneurs. See Meurer, supra note
1, at 1201-04 (using the terms such as "small innovative firms," "small
business," "small entities," "entrepreneurs," and "inventors" interchangeably
when discussing how patent law handles this class of inventors); Janis, supra
note 1, at 920 (discussing both "independent inventors" and "small business"
when exploring the "heroic inventor motif'). Even the United States Patent and
Trademark Office lumps these individuals together when defining "small
entity." See 37 C.F.R. § 1.27 (2009) (including a "person, small business
concern, or nonprofit organization" in the definition).
This Article will follow the same custom and include all of these inventors
when using the term "individual inventors." However, these classes of inventors
have their differences, and these differences could come out in both the usage of
distinct motifs (individual inventor versus small business inventor motif) and
substantive impact. Such fidelity is not explored in this Article, mainly because,
like those commentators and the USPTO before, these different inventors are
usually lumped together, both in rhetoric and substantive analysis. I thank the
editors at the Yale Journal of Law and Technology, particularly Molly Boyle, for
raising this point.
2
See FLASH OF GENIUS (Univ. Pictures et al. 2008).
3
See Intel Corp., An "Intel Start" TV Ad-Sponsors of Tomorrow,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jqLPHrCQr21 (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
4
See Meurer, supra note 1, at 1202-03 ("Received wisdom holds that small
business plays an especially important role in the American economy in terms of
job creation, and that entrepreneurs are disproportionately responsible for
revolutionary innovations.").
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technological field. The drive and ingenuity of these small
inventors is the life-blood of American innovation. It's hardworking, creative individuals like Thomas Edison, Steve Jobs, and
Bill Gates that bring about true innovations.
This "individual inventor motif'-that small inventors play
a crucial role in creating revolutionary inventions and, in tum,
spurring the American economy-is, for the most part, widely
accepted. 5 The individual inventor motif is perhaps strongest in
those technologies where independent invention is most likelysuch as the information technologies and business methods. These
are technological areas where resources do not act as a high barrier
to invention, and thus small inventors can easily participate. 6 The
patent system has traditionally taken the individual inventor motif
to heart and seen patents as a vehicle to both fuel individual
inventors and protect them from large corporations. 7
There is another, newer narrative that Americans are
becoming more and more aware of-the story of the "patent
troll." 8 The narrative is as follows: patent trolls are patent holders
who, while not commercializing the patented invention
themselves, seek royalties from other companies who have. 9 They
hold up such companies, asserting their patent rights at the right
time to maximize the royalties they can get. For patent trolls,
patenting is about profit, not invention.
If a defendant is sued by one of these patent trolls, the
alleged infringers do not have the usual retaliatory mechanismthe ability to assert their own patents in return-because the patent
troll does not sell any products or offer any services which could
infringe. The lack of production by the patent troll also means that
society receives no benefit from the patent, just the tax of the
patent troll. 10 Such "trolling" is common in the same fields that
5

Id.; see also Janis, supra note 1, at 910-11.
See John R. Allison, et al., Software Patents, Incumbents, and Entry, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 1579, 1580-81 (2007).
7
See, e.g., J. Douglas Hawkins, Importance and Access of International
Patent Protection for the Independent Inventor, 3 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
145, 148 (1995) ("Independent inventors accounted for about half of all patent
filings in the United States around fifty years ago.").
8
See, e.g., Laurie J. Flynn, Chip Maker Wins Battle, but Faces Bigger War,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, at C8 ("Patent troll is a derogatory term used to
describe companies or individuals who make their money suing companies for
patent infringement.").
9
John M. Golden, Commentary, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85
TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2112 (2007).
10
See Mark A. Lemley & Doug Lichtman, Rethinking Patent Law's
Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 48 (2007) ("Sadly, a large and
growing number of 'patent trolls' today play this exact strategy, using patents on
obvious inventions quite literally to tax legitimate business activity."); Daniel J.
McFeely, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of Those Who Misuse
6
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most individual inventors operate in-information technologies
and business methods. These technological areas are more
susceptible to hold-up because many of the products are multicomponent, allowing a patent covering even the smallest part to
hold-up the whole technology. 11 When the product is particularly
valuable, even a patent on a small component can facilitate the
extraction of a large rent.
The intersection of these two popular narratives-that of
the individual inventor and that of the patent troll-is the focus of
this Article. Patent trolls are the targets of the current patent reform
movement. 12 One of the difficulties that has plagued the push for
change, however, is a definitional one-what exactly is a patent
troll? 13
This is where the individual inventor-the person who is
supposed to be promoted by the patent system-comes in. The
individual inventor could easily fit within some definitions of a
patent troll-both are individuals who are non-producing and
monetize their patents by seeking royalty arrangements with larger
companies. The biggest difference is that traditional thinking
vilifies one and reveres the other.
This Article examines this intersection to gain a better
understanding of the place of the individual inventor motif in
patent law. The individual inventor has been championed even
before there was United States patent law. But how has the hunt
for the patent troll impacted the individual inventor motif? This
Article answers that question by looking at both the rhetorical use
of the motif and the impact of substantive changes on individual
inventors in all three branches of government-Congress, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and the
courts (particularly the Supreme Court). 14 What this Article finds is
that the individual inventor motif is incredibly resilient, at least
rhetorically, remaining essentially unscathed by the introduction of
the US. Patent System To Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
289, 290-91 (2008) (discussing how the patent troll "causes harm to society").
11
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Hold-up and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2008-09 (2007).
12
See Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A
Transactional Model, 45 Hous. L. REV. 1165, 1199 (2008) ("To conclude, one
thrust of current patent reform efforts focuses on remedies, with the most
frequent object of discussion being the 'patent troll,' the nonexploiting owner of
a patent whose business model is based on extracting licensing fees from
unintentional infringers. ").
13
Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?,
83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1023-24 ("[It] is difficult to discern any principled
distinction between the desire of the inventor to appropriate the value of his
invention and the desire of operating firms to appropriate the value of their
inventions.").
14
See infra Section 11.B.
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the patent troll into the discourse. 15 This inquiry also unveils
additional, beneficial information about the motif. For example,
the motifs positive rhetoric is completely divorced from the
mostly negative substantive impacts of patent law changes on
individual inventors. While the rhetoric lives on, almost every
recent patent law change has been to the detriment of small
inventors. 16 Variations in the motifs usage also tell a great deal
about the various governmental institutions' roles in the patent
system-with the USPTO catering the most to individual inventors
and the courts being the most insulated from and apathetic toward
such interests. 17
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the
individual inventor motif and looks at the use and treatment of the
motif in the patent system prior to the advent of the patent troll.
Part II then examines the impact of the introduction of the patent
troll, both on the motifs rhetorical usage and the substantive
impact of patent law changes on the individual inventor. Finally,
Part III explores the implications of the Article's findings, both for
the motif itself and for understanding the roles of various
institutions in the patent system. Furthermore, pushes for patent
reform at all three institutions have been constant over the past
several years. Those who engage the patent system for reform can
also learn about the motifs effectiveness from this Article's
findings. 18 The additional insight into how the different institutions
operate within the patent system can help such activists further,
shedding light on which arguments play better in different venues.
I.

THE INDIVIDUAL INVENTOR AND THE UNITED STATES
PATENT SYSTEM

A. The Individual Inventor Motif Defined
Americans see the individual inventor as crucial to the
production of new inventions and innovations. This view of the
individual inventor, what I call "the individual inventor motif," is
infused throughout much of the history of the United States patent
system. 19 The motifs use supports the conclusion that one of the
15

See irifra Section III.A.
See irifra Section III.B.
17
See irifra Section 111.C.
18
See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the
New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 838 (2008) ("The
process that has led to this reform effort has also turned up significant rifts in the
coalition ofIP industries.").
19
The motifs origins trace back well before the U.S. patent system. Janis,
supra note 1, at 908-10 (discussing the British patent system's invocation of the
individual inventor motif).
16
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main goals of the patent system should be to assist, and in some
ways protect, the individual inventor. 20
The patent laws do very little to prompt this view. 21 The
U.S. Constitution does identify "Inventors"-the individual
creator, not corporations-as the target of the patent incentive. 22
And many of the founding fathers, the same individuals who
played a significant role in shaping the U.S. patent system, were
solo inventors themselves. 23 Rather than resulting from any
legislation, statute, or even the Constitution, invocations of the
individual inventor motif in patent discourse are the product of the
collective belief in the narrative itself: that small inventors are
crucial to technological innovation and that the patent system
should support their activities.

B. Historic Usage of the Motif
All three governmental branches have employed the
individual inventor motif before and have often made it part of
their analysis of the patent system. Mark Janis noted in his
discussion of what he calls the "heroic inventor motif' 24 that
"[c]ommentaries and legislative studies on U.S. patent law reform
in the mid-twentieth century periodically acknowledged the
interests of independent inventors."25 The USPTO has also played
to the motif, mainly through its separate fee structure and tailored
resources for individual inventors. 26 The courts, though not as
20

Id. at 910-12. Meurer points out that it is far from clear that patents actually
help individual inventors, particularly the slightly larger small company
obtaining patents. Meurer, supra note 1, at 1230-35.
21
Meurer, supra note 1, at 1203-04 ("Only a few IP law doctrines target small
firms for specific benefits .... ").
22
U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "). The patent statutes also award
patents to named inventors, not corporations. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2006).
23
See Dana Rohrabacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent System,
8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263, 270 (1995) (noting many of nation's founding
fathers were technologists).
24
While Janis uses the term "heroic inventor motif' versus this Article's usage
of "individual inventor motif," there is not much substantive difference between
what the articles are discussing. Janis focuses more on what the individual
inventor does-create a major invention-while I am focusing on a larger class
of individuals-all individual inventors, regardless of the significance of their
discovery.
25
Janis, supra note 1, at 916.
26
Janis also notes that "[a]nother example comes from mid-1960's symposium
commentary from PTO officials in honor of the 175th anniversary of the U.S.
Patent System. A symposium article published in the Journal of the Patent
Office Society offered a poetic ode to the 'Godly Inventor,' commencing, 'A
spark ignites your restless mind, a fearless soul, it starts to grind."' Id. at 912
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much as the legislative and administrative actors, have also given
credence to the individual inventor narrative. 27
Janis cataloged usage of the individual inventor motif in
patent law in the late 1990s and early 2000s. All three branches
paid homage to the individual inventor, albeit in varying degrees.

1.

Legislative

In Congress, the main reform effort during the period Janis
studied was the legislation that eventually passed as the American
Inventor's Protection Act of 1999. 28 Key provisions in the bill
dealt with the publication of the patent application prior to
issuance. 29 The proposed legislation changed the longstanding
practice that kept applications secret until the patent was allowed
and issued. The legislation as originally proposed would publish all
applications eighteen months after filing. 30
Janis noted that this publication requirement met strong
resistance from the individual inventors' lobby, which argued that
early publication would essentially lead to theft of the small
inventor's ideas by large corporations. 31 As William P. Parker,
President of the Vermont Inventors Association, put it, "[t]he ideathieves can make money from the idea before the patent even
issues and when they are challenged, are in a better position
financially to defend themselves than the legitimate owner." 32
Congress responded by amending the proposed legislation
to allow patent applicants to opt out of the eighteen-month
publication if the applicant was willing not to file for patents in
foreign jurisdictions (which required such pre-publication). 33 This
amendment allowed individual inventors, who most likely would
not be filing foreign given the high cost and low benefit of such
filing to individuals, to avoid the danger of theft from early
publication. Congress also changed the name of the legislation to
the American Inventor's Protection Act, explicitly paying homage
to the individual inventor. 34 The legislation also included
provisions to help protect small inventors from the invention

(quoting Isaac Fleischmann, The Patent Office and the Independent Inventor, 47
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 459, 465 (2965)).
27
Id. ("The heroic inventor motif also manifests itself in judicial opinions.").
28
Id. at 919-20.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32
Id. (quoting The Omnibus Patent Act of 1997: Hearings on S. 507 and HR.
400 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 49 (1997)).
33
35 U.S.C. §§ 122(b), 154(b) (2006).
34
Janis, supra note 1, at 920.
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promotion business. 35 The final legislation did, however, contain
provisions that individual inventors opposed. 36 But the changes
made and the final naming of the act evidenced Congress's
willingness to assist the individual inventor.

2.

Administrative

The motif was also alive and well at the USPTO in the late
1990s and early 2000s. The USPTO's website contained a special
set of resources for small inventors. As Janis noted, the USPTO's
"Independent Inventor Resources" 37 section started with the
following text: "To paraphrase our Declaration of Independence,
America is the land of the free, home of the brave, and haven for
the independent inventor. Nowhere else in the world does a
government exist that supports its independent inventors to the
extent that we do. The independent inventor is America's natural
resource." 38 As it has historically, the PTO also maintained a
separate fee schedule for small inventors, allowing those who
qualified for small entity status to pay essentially half the usual
amount for most patent application filing fees. 39

3.

Judicial

Some judges, while not as much as Congress and the
USPTO, have also shown some concern for individual inventors
during the time period studied by Janis. For example, Judge Linn
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
dissented from the court's en bane ruling on prosecution history
estoppel, arguing, in part, that the majority's rigid rule "wrongfully
set[] in place a regime that increases the cost and complexity of
patent prosecution to the detriment of individual inventors"40 and
"discount[ed] the intrinsic worth in treating more fairly the
individual inventor whose patent right is under administrative
35

35 U.S.C. § 297; Janis, supra note 1, at 921.
Janis, supra note 1, at 919-21; Phyllis Schlafly, Don't Fall for "Phony Patent
Reform," INVENTORS VOICE, Aug. 1, 1999, http://www.inventionconvention.com
/inventorsvoice/urgentalerts/080199schlafly.html ("This bill is called the
American Inventors Protection Act, but should be called the Inventors
Elimination Act. The independent inventors would be squeezed out and their
inventions stolen from them, all for the benefit of the foreigners and the giant
corporations.").
37
Janis, supra note 1, at 911.
38
Id. (quoting Independent Inventor Resources, http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/com/iip/welcome.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2001)).
39
Muerer, supra note 1, at 1203-04.
4
° Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 620
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (en bane) (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36
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scrutiny."41 Janis also identified other times Federal Circuit judges,
during this time period, discussed a particular patent rule's impact
on small inventors. 42 Notably, however, the individual inventor
motif never really played a deciding role in a majority decision
during the time period Janis studied. While individual judges have
discussed individual inventors, the courts, in majority opinions,
have not.
II. "PATENT TROLLS" AND THE INDIVIDUAL INVENTOR
MOTIF

Given the persistence of the motifs presence in patent law,
Janis's conclusion in 2002 that "[o]ne cannot help but expect that
patent law reform debates will continue to revert periodically to
narratives about the heroic inventor" seemed, at the time,
incontrovertible. 43 However, recently a new "favorite villain" of
the patent system has arrived-the '"patent troll' ... one of a class
of patent owners who do not provide end products or services
themselves, but who do demand royalties as a price for authorizing
the work of others."44 This description arguably includes the
individual inventor, perhaps jeopardizing the individual inventor's
role in patent reform debate. The question, explored below, is
whether the advent of the patent troll has affected the individual
inventor motif in the patent system-both the rhetorical use of the
motif and the substantive impact on individual inventors.

A. Patent Trolls and the Current Patent Reform
Movement
A major concern of current patent reformists is patent holdup.45 A patentee has a patent on a given product, or more likely a
single component of a given product, and uses that patent to hold
up the product and its producer after the producer has made a
significant investment getting the product to market. 46 This holdup situation is particularly problematic when the patent holder is a
non-producer. 47 That is, the patentee does not manufacture the
patented invention herself. This exacerbates the situation because
society does not gain anything from the patentee herself because
the product does not go to market, and the alleged infringer has
41

Id. at 628.
See Janis, supra note 1, at 913-14 (citing examples in the on-sale bar, public
use bars, and remedies areas).
43
Id. at 922.
44
Golden, supra note 9, at 2112.
45
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 2008-09.
46 Id.
47 Id.
42
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little recourse, because the common counterstrategy of threatening
the patentholder with patent infringement is often useless. 48

1.

The Patent Troll

The patentees who are non-producing and engage in holdup behavior have been labeled "patent trolls." 49 Patent troll activity
is generally frowned upon because they act as only "tollkeepers"
on the road of innovation. so Patent trolls tax innovation by
extracting licensing revenue without giving back anything in
return. 51 Instead, "[b]y acquiring [patent] claims and threatening or
pursuing litigation, the patent trolls seek and often receive
economic settlements from genuine innovators and producers that
greatly exceed the true economic value of the patents in
question." 52 The hold-up is "harmful rent-seeking," extracting
more value then what the patent is worth. 53
Modem patent reform efforts are directed towards solving
the patent troll/hold-up problem. Two of the initial reports that
sparked the modem patent reform movement-the Federal Trade
Commission's 2003 report on innovation and competition and
National Research Council's 2004 study of the patent systemboth identified hold-up as a significant problem of the U.S. patent
system. 54 Recent books on the problems with the patent system
also identify hold-up and the patent troll as a critical component of
the current patent problems. 55
48

There is, however, some societal value even in a patent being used by a
patent troll-value in the information disclosed in the patent itself, for example.
See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWAL. REV. 539, 47-550 (2009).
49
See, e.g., Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll,
10 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 5 (2005); Robert P. Merges, Introductory Note to
Brief ofAmicus Curiae in eBay v. MercExchange, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997,
997 (2006).
50
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 907 (using the term "tollkeeper[]" to
identify a patentee that does not assist the real world development of the
invention but simply takes license revenue for that development).
51
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 2-3, eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130).
52
Id. at 6-7.
53
Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive
Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 509 (2003); see also
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11.
54
See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004); FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
POLICY (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/1 O/innovationrpt.pdf.
55
See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, p ATENT FAIL URE: How
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 160 (2008)
(noting that "'troll-like' behavior is certainly a problem"); DAN L. BURK &
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2.

Definitional Problems

The hunt is on, but it faces a significant hurdle recognized
by many-who exactly is being hunted? Some view a patent troll
as anyone having certain inherent characteristics-never practicing
the patented invention and seeking only to license it. 56 Others go
further with the definition, looking for more specific actions, such
as asserting patents against practicing entities when a hold-up
situation is highly possible in order to maximize royalties. 57
It has become difficult to pick a definition that is not overor under-inclusive. For example, as Mark Lemley points out, under
an overly broad definition, most universities can be viewed as
patent trolls. 58 Universities rarely, if ever, actually commercialize
the patented technology they invent. 59 Instead, universities seek to
transfer their inventions to others and, in the process, may assert
patents in the hope of seeking royalties. 60 Such actions could be
defined as the work of a patent troll, but university-originated
inventions, purposively spurred in part by the patent system, are
seen by most as beneficial, not problematic. 61
Just like universities, individual inventors can also arguably
fall under the umbrella of patent trolls. 62 Garage inventors do not
have the means to commercialize. Their main goal from the
beginning, most likely, is to sell their patented technology to a
larger company who has the capability to bring it to market. In the
process, they may have to assert their patent to obtain such a
royalty. These characteristics and actions are part of the individual
inventor's narrative, but now they are also part of the patent troll's
as well. 63 According to one definition, a patent troll is "one of a
MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How COURTS CAN SOL VE IT 28-30
(2009).
56
Brenda Sandburg, Trolling for Dollars, LAW.COM, July 30, 2001,
http://www.law.com/jsp/PubArticle.jsp?id=900005370205 (describing the term
as defined by its creator, Peter Detkin, then assistant general counsel for Intel
Corporation).
57
Mark Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 630 (2008) ("Instead of singling out bad actors, we
should focus on the bad acts and the laws that make them possible. We will
solve the troll problem not by hunting down and eliminating trolls, but by
hunting down and eliminating the many legal rules that facilitate the capture by
patent owners of a disproportionate share of an irreversible investment.").
58
Id. at 629.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61
Id. at 629-30.
62
See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in
Judicial Activism in Interpreting the Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 165, 173 (2007) ("[S]o-called patent
trolls are often independent inventors or small startups.").
63
See supra Section II.A.
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class of patent owners who do not provide end products or services
themselves, but who do demand royalties as a price for authorizing
the work of others."64 The same could be said of the individual
inventor.
As Ronald Mann puts it, "any effort to design a suitable
definition of the term 'troll' is likely to lend credence to the view
that the status as a troll is in the eye of the beholder."65 Some
individual inventors will introduce real hold-up problems, and thus
are legitimately patent trolls. However, a significant number will
certainly not. 66

B. The Patent Troll's Impact on the Individual Inventor
Motif
Given the focus on eradicating the patent troll and the
individual inventor's similarities to a patent troll, the individual
inventor motif may be in real trouble in modem patent discourse.
Has the individual inventor universally become the villainous
patent troll or has the motif remained unscathed (or is it sitting
somewhere in between)?
This Section attempts to measure the current status of the
individual inventor motif in patent law in two ways. First, it
examines the usage of individual inventor rhetoric by all three
governmental branches to see if the motif is invoked as strongly as
it was before the current emphasis on the patent troll. 67 Second, it
examines major patent law changes by the three branches to see if
these changes-most seeking to remedy the harms of patent
trolls-negatively impact individual inventors. By examining both
the rhetorical use and the substantive impact of the motif since the
rise of the patent troll, the current status of the individual inventor,
at least in the eyes of major government actors, is hopefully
clarified.

64

Golden, supra note 9, at 2112.
Mann, supra note 13, at 1023-24 ("It is difficult to discern any principled
distinction between the desire of the inventor to appropriate the value of his
invention and the desire of operating firms to appropriate the value of their
inventions.").
66
See Marc Morgan, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures:
A Comment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 17 FED. CIR.
B.J. 165, 177 (2008) ("[I]ndividual inventors should not be considered patent
trolls. Though they do not produce their innovations, individual inventors are
crucial to America's technological growth and account for 18% or more of the
patent filers in the USPTO.").
67
The study performed by this Article can be contrasted to Janis's work. Janis's
work covers a perfect, contrasting time frame-right before the reform
movement that focuses on patent trolls and the major patent system reports. See
Janis, supra note 1, at 913-22.
65
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1.

Legislative View

The major modem patent reform bill has been before
Congress since 2005. 68 While the specifics of the legislation
proposed over the last four years varies, a majority of the
amendments-from damages reform to post-grant opposition
mechanisms-are meant to remedy the hold-up/patent troll
problem. None of the proposed legislation has passed, with the
2009 version having yet to be passed by either the House or
Senate. 69 The Patent Reform Act of 2007-H.R. 1908-came the
closest to becoming law-passing in the House, but failing in the
Senate. 70 Thus, while there have been no significant legislative
changes recently, the discourse surrounding the proposed patent
reform bills-particularly H.R. 1908-as well as their substance,
provide insight as to Congress's current view of the individual
inventor in the age of the patent troll.
1.

Rhetoric

In general, the discussions surrounding pending patent
reform legislation include a very positive individual inventor
narrative. No one in Congress during this period questioned the
need to support individual inventors or look out for their special
concems. 7 Discussions of patent trolls and hold-ups were kept
distinct and separate from mentions of the small inventor. 72
In fact, small inventors were affirmatively made a part of
the legislative process. Almost every committee meeting on patent
reform included a panelist who was herself, or represented, an
individual or small inventor. 73 The House Committee on Small
68

Patent Reform Act of2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
See Patent Reform Act of2009, S. 515, 11 lth Cong. (2009).
70
Patent Reform Act of2007, H.R. 1908, 1 lOth Cong. (2007).
71
See 153 CONG. REC. H 10,270, 10,301 (2007) (statement of Rep. JacksonLee) ("[W]e must always be mindful of the importance of ensuring that small
companies have the same opportunities to innovate and have their inventions
patented and that the laws will continue to protect their valuable intellectual
property.").
72
See Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H Comm. of the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 4 (2006) (statement of Congressman Bass) ("Dean Kamen really works
and represents what is the heart of America's economics and industrial future.
He is truly an inventor, and he owns and runs one of the Nation's few really
successful modem development labs.").
73
See, e.g., Patent Reform in the 11 lth Congress: Legislation and Recent
Court Decision: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11 lth Cong.
(2009), http:!/judiciary .senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=3701 (including
testimony from Taraneh Maghame, vice president of a small company); Patent
Trolls: Fact or Fiction?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet,
69
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Business even had a full committee hearing on the impact of patent
reform on small businesses. 74
The floor debate concerning the 2007 House version of the
patent reform legislation-H.R. 1908-provides a very interesting
perspective on the rhetorical use of the individual inventor motif
by congress. The legislation before the House contained many
provisions that were seen as hostile to small inventors. 75 H.R. 1908
would switch the U.S. patent system from first-to-invent to first-tofile and provided for automatic publication of all patent
applications at eighteen months. 76 H.R. 1908 also modified the
damages provisions and established a post-grant review system. 77
These provisions were seen by some as providing large companies
an unfair advantage in defending against allegations of patent
infringement by individual inventors. 78
Almost everyone who spoke out against the legislation, in
particular against the provisions identified above, invoked the
individual inventor motif to explain the reason the legislation was
harmful. For example, Representative Gohmert argued as follows:
[The legislation must be sponsored by] huge
defendants who wanted to drag small entrepreneurs
into dilatory situations so that their invention or
component could be usurped without proper
compensation, even though it might mean the
bankruptcy of the inventor and the destruction of
the opportunity for the little guys with the inventive
vision and spirit, which actually spurred some of the

and Intellectual Property of the H Comm. of the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006)
(including the testimony of Dean Kamen, individual inventor).
74
The Importance of Patent Reform to Small Businesses: Before the H Comm.
on Small Business, 1 lOth Cong. (2007).
75
See, e.g., Adam J. Sedia, Legislative Update: Storming the Last Bastion: The
Patent Reform Act of 2007 and Its Assault on the Superior First-to-Invent Rule,
18 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 79, 79 (2007) ("The bill, currently
on the Senate's legislative calendar and likely to come up for vote soon, faces
heavy opposition from several interest groups, particularly small inventors and
the biotechnology industry.").
76
Patent Reform Act of2007, H.R. 1908, 1 lOth Cong. §§ 3, 9(a) (2007).
77
Id. § 6.
78
See, e.g., Darren Cahr & Ira Kalina, Of PACS and Trolls: How the Patent
Wars May Be Coming to a Hospital Near You, 19 HEALTH LAW. 15, 16 n.9
(2006) ("Although large corporations argue in favor of changes that reduce the
risks of patent litigation, small inventors criticize proposals that disadvantage
individuals trying to enforce their patent rights while these same corporations
often have significant intellectual property licensing arms.").
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greatest developments and wealth we know and
have in this country. 79
One House member, Representative Rohrabacher even went so far
as to call the legislation the "Steal American Technologies Act." 80
Those supporting the legislation did not question the need
to protect the individual inventor. 81 Some said that the legislation
as proposed would actually help small inventors. 82 They also
addressed these concerns by promising that changes to the
legislation were made or were going to be made to address the
individual inventors' concems. 83 A few supporters went a step
further, framing the discussion as one of balancing-a tradeoff
between eradicating patent trolls and aiding the small inventor. 84
But such comments were incredibly sparse and came in a far
second to pro-individual inventor commentary from those who
supported the legislation.

79

153 CONG. REC. H 10,270, 10,278 (2007) (statement of Rep. Gohmert,
Member, Crime Subcomm. of the Judiciary Comm.) ("[I]t is big companies who
do not want others to have the opportunities that they did.").
80
Id. at 10,273-74 (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher) (noting that the legislation
"would be a disaster for individual inventors").
81
See id. at 10,276 (statement of Rep. Lofgren) (recognizing the interests of
"small inventors"); id. at 10,301 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) ("On the other
hand, Mr. Chairman, we must always be mindful of the importance of ensuring
that small companies have the same opportunities to innovate and have their
inventions patented and that the laws will continue to protect their valuable
intellectual property.").
82
See id. at 10,282 (statement of Rep. Wexler) ("This bill will nurture and
protect inventors, thereby promoting future Alexander Graham Bells and
tomorrow's Microsofts.").
83
See id. at 10,279 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) ("I am delighted that even
though there are questions about, for example, the first-to-file over the first-toinvent, this committee saw fit to add my amendment which means that there will
be periodic review so Congress will be instructed on whether or not this works
on behalf of all inventors big and small.").
84
See id. at 10,276 (statement of Rep. Lofgren) ("I represent Silicon Valley,
which has a diversity of high tech. Biotech, large companies, small companies,
universities, small inventors, pharmaceutical companies, we have got them all,
including small inventors working out of a garage. A balanced approach to
innovation is essential to all of these entities."); id. at 10,277 (statement of Rep.
Johnson) ("In order to continue to stimulate growth and reward inventors in
these various sectors, we in Congress are charged with finding the right balances
between protecting inventions and stimulating innovation."); id. at 10,280
(statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) ("Thus, it is very important that we take care
not to harm this incubator of tomorrow's technological breakthroughs. The bill
before us strikes the proper balance.").
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Substance

In sharp contrast to the unanimity of the rhetoric, the
pending legislation, particularly the H.R. 1908 version of patent
reform legislation, would negatively affect individual inventors.
Most of the legislation's provisions-particularly damage reforms
and the post-grant review provisions-were all provisions that
assisted companies to defend against allegations of infringement,
particularly allegations by patent trolls. 85 While such provisions
helped those who were defendants in patent suits, the provisions
generally hurt those who would be asserting patents. This is
especially true for plaintiffs with fewer resources and less
sophistication, including small inventors. In addition, given the
unlikelihood that they will manufacture or sell products or
services, small inventors benefit more from patent strength than
they do from laws which make patent defense easier. Aside from
its pro-defendant provisions, the legislation also included the
aforementioned shifts to first-to-file and automatic publication.
Both moves were made to harmonize U.S. patent law with most
foreign patent systems, but these provisions were also generally
seen as harmful to individual inventors. 86
The legislation was, however, eventually defeated. The
current, 2009 version, which includes similar, albeit not as many,
anti-individual inventor provisions has still not passed. 87 And the
provisions that were contained in H.R. 1908 as approved by the
House, and more recent versions of the legislation, include
compromises to soften the impact on small inventors. 88 Some of
these are changes that were made during the House floor debate of
H.R. 1908. 89 Accordingly, the substantive impact of the patent troll
on the individual inventor is currently nil, and the compromises
and defeats may evidence the work of the individual inventor motif
as continuing to protect small inventors in the patent system. 90
85

See supra note 77.
See supra note 75. But see Karen Simon, The Patent Reform Act's Proposed
First-to-File Standard: Needed Reform or Constitutional Blunder?, 6 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 129, 138 n.77 (2006) (noting that the current
first-to-invent regime in the United States is "costly" to small inventors because
it prompts "large inventors to challenge the patents of small inventors more
frequently" by filing interferences).
87
See Patent Reform Act of2009, S. 515, 11 lth Cong. (2009).
88
See 153 CONG. REC. H. at 10,297 (statement of Rep. Issa) (offering a floor
amendment to the early publication portion of H.R. 1908); see also Patent
Reform Act of2009 § 7 (removing the automatic publication requirement).
89
See 153 CONG. REC.Hat 10,297.
90
See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 468
(2004) (discussing the success of the small inventors lobby). Another
explanation, explored more infra Section 111.B, is that the changes were made to
protect the pharmaceutical industry, not the small inventor.
86
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2.

Administrative View

The USPTO's own literature, particularly on its website,
provides insight into its current view of individual inventors. The
US PTO' s response to comments on two recent rule packages also
provides indication that the motif is alive and well at the USPTO.
This Subsection examines both the rhetoric used by the USPTO
regarding individual inventors as well as the substantive impact of
its rulemaking.
1.

Rhetoric

The USPTO has continued to describe the individual
inventor in a positive light. The USPTO website has an entire
section devoted solely to resources for independent inventors. 91
The USPTO has also espoused positive rhetoric concerning
individual inventors in its response to comments on one of the two
rule packages it issued in the last couple of years. In the first of the
two rule packages, the USPTO issued rules concerning the
continuation of patent application filings and claim limitations
rules that were set to go into effect at November 1, 2007. 92 The
rules essentially limited the number of times a patent applicant
could file for continuations of patent prosecution for a single
application. 93 The rules also limited the number of claims per
application. 94
A significant number of the comments received by the
USPTO asserted that the rules would have a particularly harmful
impact on small inventors, or as the USPTO identifies them, small
entities. 95 The USPTO confronted these comments head-on. They
91

U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Independent Inventors, http://www.uspto
.gov/inventors/independent/index.jsp (last visited Dec. 16, 2009).
92
See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent
Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of
Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). Due to litigation over the validity of the rules, the
effective date, if they ever become effective, is still uncertain. See Tafas v. Doll,
559 F.3d 1345, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding the claim limitation rules
valid, and the continuation rules invalid because they conflicted with 35 U.S.C.
§ 120 (2006), and remanding the case to the district court).
93
See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, 72 Fed. Reg. at
46,716-17 (revising 37 C.F.R. § 1.78, pertaining to continuations, and 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.114, pertaining to requests for continued examination).
94
See id. (revising 37 C.F.R. § 1.75, limiting the total number of claims per
application to no more than five independent claims and twenty-five total
claims, and 37 C.F.R. § 1.265, describing the examination support document
needed to be submitted to go beyond these limitations).
95
See id. at 46,743-44, 46,745, 46,754, 46,758, 46,759-60, 46,763, 46,765-66,
46,783, 46,788, 46,793, 46,798, 46,801, 46,811, 46,824, 46,828 (containing
comments concerned with the proposed rules' impact on small entities). A small
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did not dispute the underlying premise that small inventors'
concerns were worth addressing. Instead, they answered whether
the rules would have a negative impact on individual inventors and
whether such concerns needed addressing. 96 The USPTO also
articulated the overall purpose of the rules as inventor-neutral. 97
The USPTO stated that the rules are meant to reduce examination
backlog and improve the quality of examination across the board,
not to address the patent hold-up problem, or, more specifically,
the patent troll problem. 98
11.

Substance

The USPTO continues to adjust filing fees based on the
filing entity's size. 99 Small entities still have their fees essentially
cut in half as compared to other applicants. 100 The rationale is that
higher fees uniquely bar individual inventors' access to the patent
system because of their lack of resources. 101 The adjustment of
filing fees is meant to equalize access to the patent system between
large and small inventors. In addition to these fee adjustments, the
USPTO also made changes to the two recent rule packages to
address substantive concerns of individual inventors.
One of the main substantive concerns with the continuation
rule package was that limiting the continuations available would
harm small inventors. This is because such inventors are both more
likely to file continuations and have fewer resources to effectively
obtain adequate patent rights when continuations are limited. 102
Individual inventors need patents earlier in the development
process to secure investment. Thus, they need to separate earlier
allowed claims and then continue prosecution on still-rejected
claims. In addition, small inventors often cannot spend as much up
front, and thus need continuations to spread out their application
entity, as defined by the USPTO, includes a "person, small business concern, or
nonprofit organization." 37 C.F.R. § 1.27 (2008).
96
See id. at 46,743-44, 46,745, 46,754, 46,758, 46,759-60, 46,763, 46,765-66,
46,783, 46,788, 46,793, 46,798, 46,801, 46,811, 46,824, 46,828.
97
See, e.g., id. at 46,760 ("The changes being adopted in this final rule [37
C.F .R. § 1. 78] do not disproportionately impact small entities.").
98
See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Changes to Practice
for Continued Examination Filings, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716.
99
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(a)(l) (setting forth the filing fee for both a regular
applicant and a small entity).
loo Id.
101

See Mike R. Turner, Note, The Future of the Corroboration Requirement in
Patent Law: Why a Clear, Strict Standard Benefits All, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1319, 1344 ("[T]he government has been careful to avoid shutting the door to
the patent office on small entities.").
102
Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, 72 Fed. Reg. at
46,759, 46,765-66.
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costs. 103 The package also addressed the argument that small
entities simply make up the majority of continuation filings. 104
The USPTO responded to these comments, as well as those
from other ty~es of inventors, by relaxing the limitation on
continuations. 1 5 As compared to the initially proposed rules,
instead of one continuation, an applicant could now file two as a
matter of right. To obtain further time, an applicant could in
addition file a request for continued examination. Furthermore, as
the USPTO pointed out, small inventors can file even more
continuations than these, they just have to meet the justification
criteria. 106
The USPTO also did a study to examine the substantive
impact of the continuation limitations on small inventors. The
USPTO found that 2.9% of applications filed by small inventors
included enough continuations to require special justification under
the new rules. 107 This was in comparison to a slightly lower rate,
2. 7%, for all patent applications. 108
There was also concern about the continuation rules'
requirement that divisional applications be filed during the
pendency of the initial application. 109 Small inventors would not be
able to spread out their prosecution costs over the sequential filing
of divisional applications, particularly as aspects of the invention
became commercially viable. The USPTO responded by amending
the rules to allow for sequential filing of divisionals. 110
Finally, there was also an argument that the limitation on
the number of claims available under the continuation rules would
harm small inventors. 111 Individual inventors may need more
claims than the average inventor to provide adequate protection for
their inventions, and cannot pay the financial and procedural price
103

Id. (reporting comments asserting that "the rule changes could stifle the
building of patent portfolios for small companies and cause a reduction of
capital investment in these companies and in new technologies").
104 Id.
105
Id. at 46,759 ("The Office has made modifications to these proposed changes
such that this final rule will permit an applicant to file two continuation
applications or continuation-in-part applications, plus a single request for
continued examination in an application family, without any justification.").
106
Id. at 46,745 (noting that if an applicant wishes to pursue more than two
continuation applications, he must file a petition "showing that the amendment,
argument, or evidence sought to be entered could not have been submitted
during the prosecution of the prior-filed application.").
107
Id. at 46,760.
los Id.
109
Id. at 46,745.
uo Id. ("In response to those concerns and suggestions, [37 C.F.R.] § 1.78(d)(ii)
as adopted in this final rule does not require that a divisional application be filed
during the pendency of the initial application.").
m Id. at 46,765-66.
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of meeting the special requirement under the rules to get more
claims. 112
The USPTO responded by changing the proposed rules to
allow for more claims to be filed than originally suggested. 113 The
USPTO also studied the filings of small entities and found that
24.4% of the cases would exceed the amended limitation on
claims, as compared to a 23.7% for all applicants. 114 The
difference in impact did not appear to be disparate between
applicants as a general population and the individual inventors.
Finally, small entities could file an examination support document
("ESD") in order to obtain claims beyond those initially
allowed. 115 And the USPTO specifically amended the rules to
make this less burdensome on small entities, with § 1.256(f)
removing the most onerous part of the ESD, the requirement to
apply prior art to the proposed claims and articulate why the claims
are allowable over that art, exclusively for small entities. 116
There were also substantive concerns regarding the second,
more recent rule package that contained procedural changes to
filing appeals to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. 117
There was discussion about whether the rules added an additional
filing cost that would significantly impact small inventors. 118 This
debate arose not so much in response to comments, but from the
US PTO' s discussion in response to the requirements of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act. 119 After making some assumptions
about the number of individual inventor applicants that would
exceed the space limitations, the USPTO concluded that the impact
would be small and further change unnecessary. 120
Id.
Id. at 46,788.
114 Id.
m Id.
116
Id. at 46,798, 46,743-44 (noting that this inclusion was also in response to
the Regulatory Flexibility Act); see also id. at 46,798 ("A number of comments
argued that the search and analysis necessary to prepare an examination support
document would add significant cost to the preparation of an application, that
the cost would be significantly more than the $2,500 predicted by the Office,
and that this would significantly disadvantage independent inventors and small
businesses.").
117
See Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
in Ex Parte Appeals, 73 Fed. Reg. 32,938 (June 10, 2008) (to be codified at 34
C.F.R. pt. 41).
118
Id. at 32,972.
119
Id. at 32,969. Section 603 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act requires
administrative agencies to analysis the costs of regulations to small businesses
and consider alternatives to reduce the impact on such small businesses. 5
U.S.C. § 603 (2006).
120
Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals, 73 Fed. Reg. at 32,972
("When [the assumption of the number of applicants going over the page limit]
is compared to the 5,977 small entities that filed a notice of appeal with the
112
113
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3.

Judicial View

While the Federal Circuit is usually the first judicial body
that comes to mind when discussing patent law, 121 there has been a
significant amount of patent law activity at the Supreme Court
during the patent troll era. Seven opinions on significant patent law
areas have issued over the past four years. 122 And in almost every
single one, amicus briefs were filed asserting that individual
inventor's interests were at stake. Accordingly, the following
analysis focuses on the Supreme Court and looks at both the
rhetoric in, and substantive effect of, these decisions concemmg
the individual inventor. 123
1.

Rhetoric

In only one patent case out of the eight issued since 2003
has the Court explicitly mentioned the individual inventor. In
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C., the Supreme Court held that
the general four-factor test for determining whether a permanent
injunction should issue must be used in patent cases. 124 Under the

Office in FY 2007 (21,653 notices of appeal were filed by large entities in the
same period), it demonstrates that the petition fee has the potential to affect only
2.8% of the small entities filing an appeal. An effect on 2.8% of the small
entities filing an appeal is not a disproportionate impact on small entities, nor is
the actual number of 166 impacted small entities a substantial number.").
121
See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator": A
Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions of Patent Law, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 657 (2009); Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme
Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387.
122
See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008);
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118
(2007); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 926
(2006); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Ill. Tool
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
123
Interestingly, there was little mention of the individual inventor by the
Federal Circuit over the last five years. A search was done on the CTAF
database on Westlaw-("small inventor" "small inventors" "small entity"
"individual inventor" "individual inventors" "individual inventor" "individual
inventors" "entrepreneur" "entrepreneurs" "small entities" "small business"
"small businesses" "garage inventor" "garage inventors" "start-up" "self-made
inventor") & da(last 5 years) & patent!-and only one case included a
discussion related to the individual inventor motif, in Vada v. Cordis Corp., 536
F.3d 1311, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008), where the Federal Circuit dismissed Yoda's
argument that the denial of a permanent injunction to Voda conflicted with the
provision permitting "self-made inventor[s]" to obtain injunctions in the
Supreme Court's eBay holding.
124
547 U.S. 388.
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facts of the case, there was a question as to whether non-practicing
entities could obtain permanent injunctions. 125
In the Court's decision, the majority rejected the
categorical rule that all patentees who are both willing to license
and are not commercially practicing their patents should not be
awarded injunctions. The Court identified "university researchers"
and "self-made inventors" as those who "may be able to satisfy the
traditional four-factor test." 126 The Court essentially stated that the
"self-made inventor[]"-the individual inventor-could still obtain
an injunction after the eBay decision.
One of the concurrences also focused on the type of patent
holder seeking an injunction. That concurrence, authored by
Justice Kennedy and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer,1 27 indicated that district courts should take note of "the
nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of
the patent holder," and in eBay, the function of the patent holder
was "quite unlike earlier cases," presumably because it involved a
business method patent and, arguably, a patentee who was only
trying to license the patent, not commercialize it. 128 The
concurrence identified the existence of industries where firms use
patents mainly to obtain licensing fees. Injunctions in these
instances "can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge
exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice
the patent." 129 In this context, the concurrence discussed the patent
hold-up problem, noting that "[w]hen the patented invention is but
a small component of the product the companies seek to produce
and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue
leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to
compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve
the public interest." 130 Justice Kennedy's concurrence focused on
patentees that exhibit patent troll-like characteristics, concluding
that injunctions should not be available to such individuals.
The majority took a neutral view of the individual
inventor-telling district courts not to immediately conclude that a
small inventor does not deserve an injunction. 131 The majority did
not, however, go so far as to require that all individual inventors
receive an injunction-like large firms, they have to satisfy the
four factor test. However, the concurrence authored by Justice
Kennedy muddled this message by focusing on the patent troll.
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id. at 393.
Id.
Id. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 396-97.
Id. at 393 (majority opinion).
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The concurrence encouraged district courts to watch out for patent
hold-up situations, caused by patent holders just looking to
monetize their patents. These cases, involving non-practicing
entities using patents solely for monetary purposes, signify the rise
of the patent troll problem, not seen in the "earlier cases." 132 In the
concurrence's view, the focus is on removing the unfair advantages
injunctions give to some non-practicing entities who seek to
license-a category of patentee that is commonly comprised of
individual inventors.
11.

Substance

When comparing the majority decision in eBay to
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, the Court's rhetorical use of the
individual inventor motif is inconclusive at best. The substantive
story, however, is a bit clearer. Almost all of the Court's recent
patent decisions have reached holdings that are detrimental to
individual inventors. The main reason this is the case is that all of
the decisions essentially weaken patent rights, and it's the patent
right-not the shielding from accusations of patent infringementthat benefits individual inventors the most. 133
For example, while the majority in eBay expressly
indicated that "self-made inventors" should not be uniquely
harmed by the Court's decision, 134 this rhetoric has not stopped
lower courts from denying injunctions to individual inventors. In
fact, that language has been cited and then dismissed in a majority
of cases denying injunctions to small inventors. 135 This is because
the four-factor test for an injunction places small inventors at a
disadvantage, particularly when read in light of Justice Kennedy's
concurrence. As John Golden summarizes it:
Despite the unanimous Court's warning against
"certain expansive principles suggesting that
injunctive relief could not issue in a broad swath of
cases," district courts have responded in apparent
lockstep to Justice Kennedy's concerns about trolls.
Since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in eBay,
district courts appear to have consistently denied
permanent injunctions in cases where an infringer
has contested the patent holder's request for such
132

Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
But see BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 55, at 173-77 (concluding that
patents are not as valuable to individual inventors as other methods of
appropriating value from their innovation).
134
547 U.S. at 393.
135
See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
133
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relief and the infringer and patent holder were not
competitors. 136
Golden continues in his analysis by noting that "[s]ystematically
curtailing injunctive relief for such patent holders may inflict
injury on patent trolls, but it may also victimize those classes of
inventors whom patent law should be most careful to protect." 137
The class he is referencing includes individual inventors.
Many other recent patent decisions by the Court seem to
come out against positions advocated for by individual inventors.
For example, in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 138 the Court held
that 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), while making the combination of a
patented invention outside the United States actionable
infringement in some cases, does not cover the sending of software
from the United States to a foreign manufacturer who uses the
software to make a U.S. patented invention abroad. The argument
by small companies and universities was that holding such activity
not to be infringement created a loophole that corporations like
Microsoft could take advantage of. 139 Companies with foreign ties
would be able to send their manufacturing abroad to avoid
infringement, and could avoid liability for stealing a less powerful
entity's invention that way. 140
The Supreme Court's decision in Medimmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc. 141 disadvantages individual inventors because the
decision makes it easier for potential infringers-those who
individual inventors will enforce their patents against-to avoid
contractual obligations and forum shop. In Medimmune, the
Supreme Court concluded that a licensee can challenge the
licensed patent's validity without terminating or breaching the
underlying license. 142 The result of this holding also lowered the
bar as to what creates an "actual controversy" for the purposes of
sparking a valid declaratory judgment action, essentially allowing
alleged infringers to control forum selection in patent suits by
allowing them to file declaratory judgment actions even before

136

Golden, supra note 9, at 2113 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 2113-14
("Thus, the district courts' post-eBay practice may be in some tension with the
Supreme Court's warning against the 'categorical denial of injunctive relief to
broad classes of patent holders.").
137
Id. at 2160.
138
550 U.S. 437 (2007).
139
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Wis. Alumni Research Found. et al. at 5-6,
Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (No. 05-1056).
140 Id.
141
549 U.S. 118 (2007).
142
Id. at 119-23.
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breaching the license. 143 Such a result, as some amici argued to the
Supreme Court, "erode[s] the sanctity of contracts and interfere[s]
with vital policies favoring amicable resolution of commercial
matters" that are so crucial for patentees who depend on royalty
. their
. patents. 144 It a1so puts sma11 mventors,
.
streams to monetize
who would normally be looking for licenses as opposed to overtly
seeking out litigation, at a disadvantage to large corporations who
can take advantage of the forum advantages that filing early
declaratory judgment actions present. 145
Individual inventors are also disadvantaged
the Court's
decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. 14 because the
case's change to the nonobviousness requirement makes
patentability determinations unpredictable. The KSR decision
rejected a "rigid" test for nonobviousness and replaced it with a
"flexible" and "functional" approach. 147 Some argued that such a
shift would render most significant individual inventors'
inventions obvious. 148 "While large business may be only slightly
impacted" by the hindsight the Court's test introduces, "small
business concerns and struggling innovators [would be] certain to
face an instant and devastating diminishment of corporate
value." 149 Others asserted that a flexible nonobviousness
requirement would make it more difficult for individual inventors
to secure financing for their research and development because
"potential investors cannot evaluate the likelihood that the
venture's pending patent applications will be approved or that its
issued patents will be enforced." 150

bl

143

SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1377-79 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
144
See Brief of Amici Curiae The Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of
N.Y. et al. at 2, Medimmune, 549 U.S. 118 (No. 05-608).
145
Even before Medimmune, courts were concerned about the advantages an
alleged infringer might have if the requirements for filing declaratory judgment
actions were relaxed in patent cases. See, e.g., Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Transonic
Sys., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1012-13 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("Exercising
jurisdiction over declaratory-relief actions under [expanded] circumstances
would create a strong disincentive for patentees to communicate with potential
infringers before filing suit, for fear of being sued first and thus forced to litigate
in the defendant's forum of choice.").
146
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
147 Id.
148
Brief of Harold W. Milton, Jr. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at
2, KSR Int'!, 550 U.S. 398 (No. 04-1350) (stating that the inventions of
inventors like the Wright brothers and Thomas Edison might be rendered
obvious in hindsight).
149
Brief of the United Inventors Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Respondents at 2, KSR Int'!, 550 U.S. 398 (No. 04-1350).
150
Brief of Altitude Capital Partners et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 4, KSR Int'!, 550 U.S. 398 (No. 04-1350) ("Similarly, a firm like
Altitude Capital Partners will be less inclined to back an independent inventor,
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In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 151 the
Court's holding is detrimental to individual inventors because it
limits their ability to license their patents effectively. The Court in
Quanta determined that a license with a computer components
manufacturer exhausted patent rights against purchasers of such
components who used them to make, without an expressed license,
a patented system and perform a patented method. 152 Multiple
amici argued that tiered licensing, which the decision in Quanta
now makes more difficult, is a crucial vehicle by which small
inventors recoup their costs of inventing. 153 Small inventors also
rely on others to manufacture and distribute their product because
they do not have the capabilities or resources in-house. 154
III. IMPLICATIONS

The rhetoric regarding individual inventors remained
extremely positive in both Congress and the USPTO. Both of these
bodies also at least proposed substantive changes that took
individual inventors' interests into account, even if they were not
overtly pro-individual-inventor proposals. The USPTO changed its
proposed rules to take the concerns of individual inventors into
consideration, even creating a special exception for small entities
in its claim limitation rules. Although Congress never passed any
significant patent legislation during the period studied, it did
seriously consider changes that would be harmful to small
inventors. The proposed legislation, however, was modified, in
some respects, to take at least some of the small inventor's'
interests into account. The judiciary essentially did not take any
notice of individual inventors' concerns-either on a rhetorical or
a substantive level. The Supreme Court's recent decisions did,
however, reduce the value of patents, particularly for individual
inventors. The following table summarizes these results:

or will do so only on much less favorable terms that diminish incentives to
innovate, if Altitude cannot predict with reasonable confidence whether the
inventor's patents will be upheld in court.").
151
128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).
152 Id.
153
See Brief for Wi-LAN Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1922, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06-937); Brief of Amici Curiae Interdigital
Communications, LLC & Tessera, Inc. in Support of Respondent at 12, Quanta,
128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06-937); Brief of Amberwave Systems Corp. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 10, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06-937).
154
Brieffor Wi-LAN Inc., supra note 153, at 19.
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TABLE

1. PATENT TROLL-ERA HANDLING OF INDIVIDUAL
INVENTORS

Legislative
Administrative
Judicial

Rhetoric
Positive
Positive
N on-existent155

Substance
Mixed
Positive
Negative

The following section looks at the implications of these results.

A. Resilience of the Motif's Rhetoric
When the rhetoric observed by Janis shortly before the
modem patent reform efforts and the focus on the patent troll is
compared to the rhetoric examined in Section II.B, one can see that
not much has changed at all. Congress still engages heavily in the
individual inventor rhetoric. 156 The USPTO is still the strongest
ally of the individual inventor. 157 And litigants continue to invoke
the rhetoric in litigation, while the courts, maybe even less so now,
do not seem to engage the motif at all. 158
Other than perhaps the slight drop off by the courts, the
individual inventor motif remains rhetorically intact-at least as
much as it was before the advent of the patent troll. Those
primarily engaged in the usage of rhetoric-mainly Congress and
the USPTO-are able to keep the small inventor and the patent
troll separate. 159 The definitional concerns the patent troll hunt
presents for the individual inventor motif are not justified. The
garage inventor is still a narrative that policymakers find worth
telling.

B. Lack of Substance Behind the Motif
It has been suggested before, most recently by Meurer, that
while the motif is strong, there is very little doctrine, or laws for
that matter, that are specifically designed to benefit the individual
155

The Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. does mention "self-made
inventors." 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006). Justice Kennedy's concurrence focuses on
patent trolls, but not necessarily individual inventors. Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). However, the majority's discussion is still neutral and mentions
individual inventors sparingly-it does not establish a pro-individual-inventor
view of injunctions. And Justice Kennedy never discusses the size of the patent
trolls he is focused on, so whether he is considering the individual inventor in
his analysis is unclear.
156
See supra Subsection II.B.1.a.
157
See supra Subsection II.B.2.a.
158
See supra Subsection II.B.3.a.
159
See supra Subsections 11.B.1.a, II.B.2.a.
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inventor. 160 Other than a few patent rules, there are no positive
laws protecting individual inventors. 161 The Congress attempts to
stay, at best, neutral and simply avoid passing laws that
disadvantage individual inventors. 162 Arguably, the Supreme Court
tried to do the same in eBay, albeit perhaps unsuccessfully. 163
Although the rhetoric is still employed, there is just no substance
standing behind it. Other than the USPTO reducing some of the
application filing burden on small inventors, there is little else that
the patent system does to assist such individuals or address their
concerns specifically.
In fact, most of the patent law changes either proposed or
actually made, mainly in the courts, have come out against
individual inventors" interests. The provisions still being
discussed in Congress focus on providing defendants with recourse
to combat infringement actions, and are thus opposed by small
inventor interest groups. 164 The same, anti-individual inventor
effect can be found in recent Supreme Court decisions, with each
recent patent decision making it more difficult to successfully
enforce patent rights. 165 Thus, while the rhetoric remains strong,
the emptiness of it is self-evident. The troll hunt may have not
damaged the individual inventor's image, but it certainly has
created substantive changes that cut against small inventors.
The House debate over H.R. 1908 epitomizes the emptiness
of the individual inventor motif. Opponents of the bill focus solely
on the bill's impact on the small inventor. 166 And proponents,
unwilling to verbally attack the individual inventor, played along
rhetorically despite the fact that the law they were supporting made
substantive changes that were potentially adverse. 167 What makes
this exchange even more interesting is that the real substance of the
debate was probably not big business versus the little inventor, but
the information technology industry versus pharmaceutical
companies. 168 And the opposition to the bill-supported mostly by
big pharma---did not harp on the legislation's impact on the
160

See Meurer, supra note 1, at 1202-03.
See supra note 103.
162
See supra Subsection 11.B.1.b (describing Congress's recent patent
lawmaking efforts).
163
Golden, supra note 9, at 2113-14.
164
See Patent Reform Act of2009, S. 515, 11 lth Cong. (2009).
165
See supra Subsection 11.B.3.b (cataloging these decisions).
166
See supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
167
See supra text accompanying note 86.
168
See Meurer, supra note 1, at 1214 ("Recent discussions of patent reform
emphasize the disparate interests of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries on one side, and the information and communication technology
industries on the other. Some of the discussion also notes tension between small
inventors and big information and communications technology firms.").
161
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pharmaceutical industry, but on the individual inventors. It is
highly unlikely that the small inventor was the main concern of
opponents, but at least externally that is how it appeared. 169
Pharmaceutical companies have an interest in stronger patent laws,
and since this interests aligned with those of individual inventors,
which also commonly benefit from stronger patent laws, pharma
found a friend. 170 The motif was an empty vessel that could dress
up the concerns of another, perhaps less sympathetic interest
group. 171 Presumably, if the interests of another powerful industry
lined up with those of individual inventors, that industry would
utilize the rhetoric of individual inventors for the same reason.
Looking at the recent discourse involving individual
inventors shows that it truly is only a rhetorical motif, and not
much more, particularly outside the USPTO. Essentially, the motif
invokes a very powerful narrative-a story that almost all
Americans understand,1 72 but one that does not drive dramatic
substantive change, particularly substantive change in favor of
individual inventors. 173 Instead, the motif is co-opted-particularly
in Congress-by those parties whose interests are best furthered by
policies that strengthen patent rights.
C. Roles of the Different Institutions in Patent Law

How different institutions have handled individual
inventors' interests, particularly in the age of the patent troll,
illustrates a great deal about the role of various institutions in
patent law.
The USPTO has been the most receptive to the rhetorical
use of the individual inventor motif and actually substantively
acted upon it, modifying proposed rules to give individual
inventors specific exemptions. 17 Such a result makes sense from
an institutional perspective for a number of reasons. First, the
USPTO engages patentees almost exclusively on the patent
169

Id.

170

See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent
System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1353 (2009) ("Other sectors, for example,
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, which depend heavily on patents
to support their R&D projects and sustain their market positions, will prefer a
strong patent system to foster market value for their innovations.").
171
See Janis, supra note 1, at 911 ("One might expect patent reformers to be
drawn to the strategy of reconceptualizing the reform debate by attempting to
couple technical reform measures with the romantic imagery of the lone
inventor struggling against a recalcitrant bureaucracy.").
172
Id. ("[T]he heroic inventor motif, with its overtones of Jeffersonian selfreliance and Yankee ingenuity, may simply mesh uniquely well with the
American perception of its own identity.").
173
See supra Section 11.B.
174
See supra Subsection II.B.2.
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acquisition side of the equation. The USPTO focuses on when
individuals should, and should not, obtain patent rights. 175 This
turns out to be the side of the patent system that individual
inventors engage most. It is also the side the motif focuses on-the
ability of individual inventors to create ground-breaking
inventions. The motif should have the most impact on the frontend of patent law, and thus the USPTO. Second, the USPTO's
receptiveness to the motif also exemplifies the customer service
nature of the agency .176 Finally, there are larger pro-small business
attitudes at play when considering administrative agency. For
example, the Regulatory Flexibility Act is focused solely on
helping small businesses interact with regulatory agencies like the
USPT0. 177 In both responses to comments on the recently
proposed rules, many of the USPTO's responses to individual
inventors' concerns were in response, in part, to the US PTO' s duty
under the Act.
This individual-inventor-friendly environment at the
USPTO sits in sharp contrast to the judiciary's ambivalence to
individual inventors' concerns. Every time individual inventors
came up in the briefs, except arguably in eBay, the Supreme Court
ignored them in the Court's ultimate decision. 178 This makes sense
from an institutional perspective given the law that governed each
of those cases made no special exceptions for small inventors. In
fact, nothin~ within the Patent Act treats such inventors
differently. 17 Given that overt direction, or lack thereof, by
Congress, courts, as they arguably should, address only those
concerns identified by legislators. The Supreme Court's handling
of the motif evidences restraint, a lack of judicial activism, for
want of a better term. 180 The judiciary's failure to consider the
175

See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What
the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 27677 (2007) ("Instead of asking whether a given patent is necessary to promote
innovation, the patent statute directs the PTO to determine whether the patent
application meets validity standards that have scientific and technical
underpinnings.").
176
See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1559, 1567 (2006) (reviewing ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN p ATENT
SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To Do
ABOUT IT (2004)) ("[T]he PTO's profit orientation disposes it to grant its
customer/clients' patents. Nor are these patents invalidated when they get to
court.").
177
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2006).
178
See supra Subsection 11.B.3.b.
179
See Meurer, supra note 1, at 1202-03.
180
Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute
Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 393-94 (2008)
(setting forth a definition of judicial activism).

82

THE INDIVIDUAL INVENTOR MOTIF IN THE AGE OF THE PATENT
TROLL

motif is the way it is supposed to work-with the courts immune to
rhetoric and popular opinion, particularly popular opinion that is
not expressed in any specific statutory provision. 181 This reason for
the general absence of the motif seems especially likely given the
court's language in eBay. The case discusses the application of
equitable remedies, an area in which courts are least constrained by
statute. And eBay is the only case in which the individual
inventors' interests made their way into the opinion. 182
The motif's lack of influence on the judiciary is also a
product of the fact that, while the USPTO is on the front end,
courts are, for all intensive purposes, on the back end of the patent
system. They see the patented invention in the context of a lawsuit
in which an allegedly infringing defendant has produced her own
product or service. 183 This context is also the one where the impact
of patent trolls is most noticed, because in those cases, the
plaintiffs have produced nothing. 184 Sometimes it is also the
context in which the individual inventor is not the only innovator,
particularly since most cases involve a defendant that did not copy
the invention, giving them some moral ground. 185 That is, the
defendant is likely to have gone through the complete invention
and development process themselves and simply come in second,
behind the first to invent. 186 The motif is, therefore, at its weakest
at the enforcement stage and perhaps most susceptible to being
ignored.
Finally, Congress's handling of the individual inventor
motif makes sense. Congress sits in the middle of these issueswith individual inventors needing to be protected on the front end
and patent trolls thwarted on the back end. Congress also is more
likely to engage in rhetoric, particularly rhetoric its constituents
understand and support. 187 And rhetoric that, in the end, turns out
to be empty.
IV. CONCLUSION
These findings have tremendous import for the individual
inventor motif and the patent system in general. The individual
inventor motif has been around for a long time and has
181

Id.

182

35 U.S.C. § 283 (indicating that district courts "may grant injunctions");
eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 389 (2006).
183
35 U.S.C. § 281 (giving a patentee a remedy of a "civil action for
infringement of his patent").
184
See supra Subsection II.A. I.
185
Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87
N.C. L. REV. 1421 (2009).
186 Id.
187
See Janis, supra note 1, at 911.
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continuously been invoked in patent discourse. At least in its
modem form, the motif has maintained its rhetorical strength in
spite of the current negative focus on patent trolls. The prevalence
of individual patent holders whose sole focus is to license their
patents, not commercialize the underlying technology, so-called
patent trolls, has not discouraged usage of the classic American
story of the individual inventor.
However, there are very few substantive changes that
match the more extensive usage of strong, pro-individual-inventor
rhetoric. Individual inventors fare better before the actor in the
patent system that sees them the most-the USPTO. But even at
the USPTO, there are not a large number of regulations being
adopted that specifically benefit the individual inventor. Thus,
those who engage the patent system for reform should take this
Article's findings to heart, to better understand in which
institutions the motif has more power and greater potential to
prompt true change. This study also provides a broader picture as
to how the various institutions are operating in the patent system to
the benefit or detriment of small, independent inventors, additional
information that reformists can use going forward.
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